Recently, I saw a hot post on Zhihu, everyone is discussing the development trend of the semiconductor industry in the future, and today, China Exportsemi is also trying to talk about this problem from the perspective of global competition. It is boldly predicted that the development of semiconductors in the next ten years will take the following forms: the global competition in the semiconductor industry is entering a new stage of "high-intensity, multi-dimensional, and long-cycle", and the game between countries/regions and enterprises has been upgraded from a simple technology competition to a composite competition of "whole industry chain ecology + geopolitics". Below, we will talk about the core dimensions of global competition:
First, the three major fissions of the competitive landscape
(1) The struggle for technological hegemony: from "process nodes" to "full-stack control"
Monopoly of advanced manufacturing processes: TSMC, Samsung, and Intel are fiercely competing in 3nm/2nm, but the technical threshold and capital expenditure (a 3nm production line investment of more than $20 billion) has left only 3 players, and the United States has passed the CHIPS Act to subsidize ($52.7 billion) to try to return advanced manufacturing to the mainland.
The right to speak on technical standards: The US-led Semiconductor Alliance (SIAC) is trying to lock in upstream standards such as EDA tools and IP cores, while China is seeking to bypass the ARM/X86 ecosystem through the RISC-V architecture (Ali Pingtou, etc.).
New materials and architecture disruption: Parallel R&D in "post-Moore" fields such as third-generation semiconductors (SiC/GaN), quantum chips, and optical computing may reshape the rules of competition.
(2) Supply chain reconstruction: from "globalization" to "regionalization"
"Friend-shoring": The United States promotes the "Chip Quadripartite Alliance" (the United States, Japan, South Korea, Taiwan), and restricts Chinese mainland's access to advanced equipment (ASML EUV lithography machine embargo); The EU plans to increase the proportion of local chip production capacity to 20% by 2030.
China's independent breakthrough: SMIC has expanded its 28nm mature process capacity, and Huawei Hubble has invested in domestic equipment/materials companies (such as China Micro Corporation and Shanghai Silicon Industry), but key links (such as lithography machines below 14nm) are still controlled by others.
(3) Market and capital game: national will vs. business logic
Government subsidy arms race: The US CHIPS Act is $52.7 billion, the European Union's CHIPS Act is 43 billion euros, and Japan subsidizes 40% of the cost of TSMC's Kumamoto factory.
Increase in non-market-oriented means: The United States has "long-arm jurisdiction" over China (restricting Huawei, Yangtze River Storage, etc.), and the Netherlands has joined the export control of lithography machines to China, and the trend of politicization of technological competition is obvious.
Second, competitive strategies of major economies
Let's show it in a table:
Figure: Competitive strategies and core strengths of the world's major economies
Third, the key battlefield of future competition
(1) Technical blockade and counter-blockade
The U.S. strategy of "small courtyards and high walls" against China: precision attacks on China's advanced processes (restricting the export of ASML DUV lithography machines), but may force China to achieve 100% localization (equipment, materials, design) in mature processes (28nm).
China's "asymmetric breakthroughs" are improving performance through chiplet technology (such as Huawei's 3D stacked chips), or moving to new architectures such as integrated storage and computing to bypass process limitations.
(2) Overcapacity and price wars
The wave of global wafer fab expansion in 2023-2024 (China's new 28nm production capacity accounts for 70% of the world's total) may lead to a price war for mature processes, but the incremental demand for automotive/industrial chips may alleviate the impact.
(3) The competition for talent is fierce
TSMC's U.S. factories are facing a culture clash and China is attracting overseas semiconductor talent with 3-5 times the salary, and human resources have become a more scarce factor than capital.
Fourth, the enlightenment to enterprises
Rules of Survival:
Leading enterprises (TSMC, Intel): must be bound to national strategies (such as the US "Chips Act"), and at the same time disperse production capacity (TSMC builds factories in the United States/Japan/Germany).
Chinese manufacturers: focus on "mature process + special chips" (automotive-grade MCU, photovoltaic IGBT), and change the market with cost performance and rapid iteration.
Small and medium-sized innovators: bet on disruptive technologies (photonic chips, quantum computing) and avoid the main battlefield of giants.
Risk Warning:
Geopolitical conflicts, such as the Taiwan Strait, could lead to the disconnection of global supply chains;
Abrupt changes in technology routes (such as OpenAI's shift to optical computing) may devalue traditional chip investments.
fifth, summary: Competition will reshape the global power structure in science and technology
The semiconductor industry has gone beyond the economic scope and has become the strategic fulcrum of the country's comprehensive strength. The editor of China Exportsemi boldly predicts that the next ten years will take the following forms:
Technology stratification: the United States dominates the design/equipment, East Asia controls manufacturing, and China occupies some mature markets;
"Dual-track system" of supply chains: China and the United States have built a partial closed-loop system, but complete decoupling is unrealistic (China still needs to import EDA, and at the same time, the United States relies on Asian packaging);
Innovation Paradigm Shift: After Moore's Law slows down, architecture/material/packaging innovation may give rise to new giants.
Companies will need to struggle to balance "political correctness" with business logic, and the success or defeat of the country's competition will depend on long-term R&D investment (e.g., China's target chip self-sufficiency rate of 70% by 2025) and the resilience of global cooperation networks.
Disclaimer: The above content is for informational purposes only and does not constitute any professional advice or prediction. The development of the semiconductor industry is affected by a variety of factors, including but not limited to technological breakthroughs, market changes, policy adjustments, etc., and the actual development situation may differ from the above analysis and forecast. Relevant enterprises and investors should make independent judgments and decisions based on their own circumstances, and carefully assess risks.
